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Abstract
Does an increase in the quantity of legal rules influence the overall quality of the formal 
institution to which they belong? In this article, we draw upon a longitudinal analysis of the 
People’s Republic of China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy Law in order to answer this question. We 
aim to examine the degree to which the proliferation of legal provisions, as opposed to the 
elaboration of the statute, affects organisational compliance with the law. In doing this, we find 
that when the expansion of the law leads to rule accretion in the absence of rule refinement, the 
use of the bankruptcy law by private organisations diminishes. 
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1 Introduction 
Rules produce rules, or more accurately, the codified provisions of a statute tend to 
multiply over time.1 Yet, although laws are often treated as formal, or even parchment 
institutions, whether alteration of the actual rules that make up this institution in 
aggregate affect, or change, the institution itself is a matter of some debate.2 On the one 
hand, an increase in the number of rules may indicate a process of ongoing refinement, 
or that the formal institution is keeping pace with its environment.3 However, on 
the other hand, rule accretion may increase the complexity of the formal apparatus 
surrounding the institution, which in turn increases the informational and effort based 
costs of compliance with a rule.4 Given this tension, can it be said that an increase in the 
quantity of legal rules influences the overall quality of the formal institution to which 
they belong?
 This article encompasses an in-depth longitudinal analysis of the People’s Republic 
of China’s (PRC) Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (EBL) and empirically models the 
generation and elaboration of its legal provisions. The influence of both types of rule 
proliferation upon the organisational use of the EBL will be examined. When the number 
of rules increases yet the refinement of the institution does not co-occur, then the use of 
the bankruptcy law by private organisations drops. The proliferation of legal rules in the 
absence of legal rule refinement is the type of institutional instability that undermines 
organisational compliance with the law.
 The study of the relationship between the development of legal rules and formal 
institutional quality contributes to an emerging body of research into legal systems in 
developing economies. The legal rules of developing nations vary considerably in terms 
of their quality, effectiveness, and survival.5 This study allows for further examination 
* Both authors are affiliated with the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 
PO Box 1738, 3000 DR, Rotterdam, The Netherlands, nbetancourt@rsm.nl, bkrug@rsm.nl.
1 J.B. Ruhl and J. Salzman, ‘Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the 
Administrative State’, 91 Georgetown Law Journal 4, at 757 (2003).
2 A. Niblett, R.A. Posner, & A. Shleifer, ‘The Evolution of a Legal Rule’, 39 Journal of Legal Studies 2, 
at 325-327 (2010). 
3 P.D. Jennings, M. Schulz, D.L. Patient, C. Gravel, & K. Yuan, ‘Weber and Legal Rule Evolution: The 
Closing of the Iron Cage?’, 26 Organization Studies 4, at 621-622 (2005).
4 See Ruhl and Salzman, above n. 1, at 763. 
5 S. Levitsky and M. Murrillo, ‘Variation in Institutional Strength’, 12 Annual Review of Political 
Science, at 115-117 (2009).
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of the degree to which this variation may arise from endogenous processes, such as an 
increase in legal rule quantity necessitated by the growing complexity of these nations’ 
economies.
 More specifically, this analysis contributes to a growing knowledge concerning 
legal reform in China. Since 1978, the issues and conflicts arising from the economic 
reform process have had a positive influence on the development of a national legal 
infrastructure, leading to a proliferation in the number of substantive legal frameworks.6 
Yet an increase in simply the amount of law written in the books does not necessarily 
equate to an improvement in the quality of China’s formal legal institutions. Adopting 
new rules in an effort to solve problems of organisational non-compliance may only 
foster further non-compliance. Since rule proliferation is inevitable, rule-makers must 
focus on the refinement of rules, as opposed to the blanket generation of new rules.
 This paper will be set out as follows. First, the theoretical logic will be explained, 
followed by an overview of the PRC Bankruptcy law and the statistical model. It will 
then conclude with a discussion of the results and a reflection upon future research.
2 The Development of Formal Institutions
2.1 Determining the Quality of Formal Institutions
The economic approach to the design and operation of legal systems tends to be 
prescriptive. The operation of legal rules that possess an economic function is often 
judged in terms of the rules’ ability to secure a certain outcome, such as aligning the 
interests of organisations or improving resource allocation.7 From this perspective, 
the effectiveness of a law is an indication of its quality. However, whilst assessing the 
law’s impact on the regulated market segment is the most direct means of measuring 
its effectiveness, the result is not always quantifiable, and rarely accounts for the effect 
of the substantive content of the law.8 Certain attributes of the legal system, such as 
the capacity and influence of the legal organisation, meaning the government agency 
or court charged with implementing and enforcing the law, may also play a role in 
determining effectiveness. 
 In order to avoid these difficulties, this article employs an alternative benchmarking 
method, through which the effectiveness of a formal institution is determined by its ability 
to engage with the organisational community which is regulated by its provisions. If a 
formal institution is able to ‘take root and generate shared behavioural expectations’,9 
then this alternative indicator of effectiveness may be seen as a proxy for the quality of 
the substantive content of the institution.10 If organisations possess some agency in their 
decision to employ a legal provision, then one measure of the quality of these provisions 
lies in their ability to attract these organisations to the formal institution or to encourage 
the use of the formal institution. 
 Yet in order for a formal institution to sustain the interest of its regulated population, 
it must evolve in a coherent fashion with the problem that it seeks to address. New rules 
arise as a response to legal lacunae, or gaps in the law, that become apparent over time. 
6 Z. Chen, ‘Capital Markets and Legal Development: The China case’,14 China Economic Review 4, at 
451-455 (2003); R. Peerenboom, China’s Long March Towards Rule of Law (2002), at 1-6.
7 R.C. Ellickson, ‘A Critique of Economic and Sociological Theories of Social Control’, 16 Yale Law 
School Faculty Scholarship Series 1 (1987). Ellickson argued that a Hobbesian focus on the legal system as 
the source of social order lends itself to the prescriptive approach, as laws may be judged by whether they 
are able to lead to order.
8 R.A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (1979).
9 See Levitsky and Murillo, above n. 5, at 116.
10 One issue with this method is that it does not directly address whether organisations are attracted to 
the employment of a formal institution as a result of its implementation or its substantive content. From a 
signaling perspective, it may be that the substantive content of a formal institution garners more attention 
than the reputation of an individual agent. See T.G. Pollock and R. Gulati, ‘Standing out from the Crowd: 
The Visibility Enhancing Effects of IPO Related Signals on Alliance Formation by Entrepreneurial Firms’, 
5 Strategic Organization 4, at 343 (2007) for a discussion of the conditions under which offer characteristics 
are capable of drawing more attention from organisational decision makers than actor characteristics.
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This process gives birth to the central proposition of the article, namely that changes 
in the quantity of formal rules may influence the quality of the formal institution they 
sustain. As the number of rules increases, the effort and information required to comply 
with them increases as well.11 Research has shown that there is not a direct correlation 
between an increase in the number of rules and an increase in the effort needed to comply. 
Rather, if the number of extant rules increases the effort required to both implement and 
comply with the rule more than doubles.12
 However, the birth of new legal rules should also have a positive effect on the 
quality of the legal institution. The refinement of a legal rule (through the creation of 
new rules) should enhance its stability and lead to increased compliance on the part of 
organisations. New rules ‘unify and systematize existing rules and law’ and may have 
a positive effect on the ‘clarity’ and ‘orderliness’ of the law.13 Since understanding and 
applying laws is not a cost-free exercise, firms that are attracted to a specific law, due 
to the manner in which that legal rule incentives economic behaviour, are not likely to 
abandon that law. This discussion of the possible consequences of rule proliferation 
details the possible effects of an increase in the quantity of rules upon the quality of a 
formal institution. 
2.2 Rule Accretion
We will firstly examine the manner in which legal rules increase over time. Drawing 
upon Weber’s view of law, we endorse a rules breed rules dynamic, or the view that 
the presence of rules leads to the generation of further rules.14 More precisely, legal 
professionals, judges and lawyers who interpret the law while applying it to a case wield 
considerable influence over the proliferation of a rule.15 The judicial interpretation of a 
rule acts as a signal of either high or low quality, usefulness or troublesomeness. The 
result may attract the attention of lawmakers, who may seek to modify the rule.16 
 Although this interpretation may hold in common law systems, it requires some 
modification in order to apply to civil law jurisdictions, such as China.17 In such 
circumstances, instead of the legal profession being the sole signaling agent, regulators 
or administrators of state agencies, working in conjunction with the organisations that 
make use of the law, also act as signaling agents.18 One result of this agentic signaling 
is the facilitation of the identification of legal lacunae, or areas for which the law does 
not provide solutions. This suggests that the rules breed rules dynamic may be even 
stronger in civil law systems than in common law systems. Given the foregoing, these 
mechanisms suggest the first hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 1: The total number of legal rules present in a body of law 
has a positive effect on the likelihood of the birth of a new rule.
2.3 Rule Refinement
In transition economies, where bankruptcy was unknown during the socialist past, the 
integration of insolvency law into the unfolding private economic framework requires 
some degree of patience. While the quality of the first output of bankruptcy law in a 
transition economy may be poor in comparison to the quality of bankruptcy law in 
11 See Ruhl and Salzman, above n. 1, at 763.
12 Id., at 766-767.
13 M. Schulz, ‘Limits to Bureaucratic Growth: The Density Dependence of Organizational Rule Births’, 
43 Administrative Science Quarterly 4, at 851 (1998); M. Weber, Economy and Society (1968; 1921), at 848
14 M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (1947; 1921); ‘Weber argued that rules 
should proliferate as part of the progressive rationalization of law’, Jennings et al., above n. 3, at 631. 
15 Id.
16 See Jennings et al., above n. 3, at 629.
17 See Peerenboom, above n. 6, at 1-6.
18 X. Zhang, L. Ortolano, & Z. Lu, ‘Agency Empowerment through Administrative Litigation Law: Court 
Enforcement of Pollution Levels in Hubei Province’, 202 The China Quarterly, at 307-326 (2010).
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developed countries, over time the bankruptcy law should develop towards market 
conforming legislation, which will aid the integration of the institution into the economy. 
The early versions of the bankruptcy law are testament to the fact that this legislation 
was not market conforming but rather, was pointed towards the iron rice bowl.19 From 
1949 to 1979, the purpose of a firm was to provide for its workers; when this perspective 
was applied to bankruptcy, it meant that the firm was obliged to look after its workers’ 
interests before satisfying their creditor. Hence, the image of the iron rice bowl, the 
cradling of the worker from birth to grave within the commercial apparatus of the state. 
For the bankruptcy law to be effective within China, it would need to be refined, moving 
away from a non-market orientation towards a market friendly approach. 
 In any bankruptcy regime, the issue of whether the law is oriented towards the 
creditor (creditor friendly) or the debtor (debtor friendly) is very important, as research 
suggests that debtor friendly regimes have system beneficial outcomes in jurisdictions 
such as China, where a high level of entrepreneurship ensures quick re-engagement of 
resources.20 Given the high level of uncertainty and entrepreneurship in the competitive 
business environment that dominates in China, this suggests that refinement towards 
market orientation would reflect a debtor friendly approach, in which new rules are 
generated that protect the assets of a firm and allow the management to correct mistakes. 
This gives rise to the second hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 2: The rate of generation of new rules increases with the 
presence of debtor friendly provisions. 
2.4 Distinguishing Proliferation from Refinement
The above hypotheses, whilst suggesting that legal rules will proliferate over time, do 
not distinguish between accretion and refinement, but rather point to their simultaneous 
occurrence within a formal institution. In order to ascertain which dynamic is influencing 
the quality of the formal institution, the effect of both proliferation and refinement upon 
the rate of organisations declaring bankruptcy is examined. 
 Research into regulatory accretion has found that the most effective strategy for 
dealing with the increasing information burden that arises with new rules is to expand 
the resource base necessary for rule interpretation.21 This expansion of an individual 
firm’s resource base will arise if the newly enacted provisions represent a refinement of 
organisation friendly provisions. As a result, the growth of new legal provisions should 
have a positive effect on the number of firms declaring bankruptcy. However, if the 
newly generated rules are unfriendly to organisations, then the growth of new rules 
should have a negative effect on the number of firms declaring bankruptcy. Therefore, 
we suggest a third hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 3: The number of firms declaring bankruptcy will decrease 
with the growth of rules if the generated rules are not debtor friendly. 
3 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law
Two foundational texts mark the starting point of the formal institution of bankruptcy 
within China. The National People’s Congress promulgated the Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on Enterprise Bankruptcy on 2 December 1986, which came into 
operation on 1 October 1988.22 On 9 April 1991, the PRC’s Civil Procedure Law (CPL) 
was approved; Chapter XIX of the CPL deepened and expanded the previous text, and 
19 C. Booth, ‘The 2006 PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law: The Wait Is Finally over’, 20 Singapore 
Academy of Law Journal, at 284 (2008).
20 J.E. Stiglitz, ‘Whither Reform? Ten Years of Transition’, 7 Voprosy Economiki (1999).
21 See Ruhl and Salzman, above n. 1, at 763.
22 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Enterprise Bankruptcy (Trial Implementation) (2 December 
1986) (“1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law”), translated in Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing 
 rule ProliferatioN aNd iNstitutioNal Quality iN the PeoPle’s rePuBlic of chiNa 135
addressed the application of the bankruptcy law to private enterprises, or non-state 
owned enterprises (SOE).23 From 1991 to 2006, all further laws on bankruptcy represent 
the further promulgation and possible refinement of the concepts set out in these two 
texts. 
 These laws were quite short. The 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law consisted of 43 
articles, while Chapter XIX of the CPL consisted of eight articles.24 As a result, the 
language used was both broad and ambiguous. Insufficient space was allocated for the 
detailing of important procedures. Chapter XIX failed to specify whether non-SOEs 
were subject to the provisions of the 1986 Law; in addition, the 1986 law did not 
establish a priority order for creditors.25 To address this issue, the Supreme People’s 
Court issued a number of opinions interpreting both laws.26 
 The first of these, the 1991 Supreme People’s Court Opinion, consisting of 76 
articles, interpreted the 1986 Chinese Bankruptcy Law. It attempted to clarify issues 
relating to precedence, such as whether workers’ rights were given precedence over 
creditors’ rights in bankruptcy. A significant issue was the applicability of provisions in 
the 1986 Bankruptcy law for SOEs to non-SOEs. The ambiguity of the law was such 
that organisations did not know which articles of a given law to apply when declaring 
bankruptcy. In addition, Article 189 of the PRC’s Company Law supplemented the 
provisions of the 1991 PRC’s CPL.27
 Despite this significant clarification, use of the law was low. From 1989 to 1993, 
the court accepted only 1,153 cases in total, an average of 191 a year.28 It has been 
estimated that prior to 1996, over 8 million enterprises existed in China, and that almost 
half of these enterprises operated at a loss.29 A national survey conducted in 1997 of 
14,923 SOEs found that 40.5% were estimated to be losing money, yet the rate of firms 
declaring bankruptcy was not increasing.30 Dissatisfaction with this low effectiveness led 
to two outcomes. Firstly, the state began to consider issuing a revised bankruptcy code. 
Secondly, the State Council issued several Bankruptcy Policy Decrees.31 These decrees 
applied to selected SOEs regardless of whether the 1986 Bankruptcy law applied.32 The 
decrees extended the reach of the 1986 law while simultaneously superseding the law; 
companies would file under the 1986 law but refer to the decrees in doing so.
 These decrees were issued in order to facilitate debt restructuring through mergers 
and acquisitions and bankruptcy filings under the Capital Structure Optimization 
Program (CSOP).33 For example, on 25 October 1994, the State Council issued a notice 
that addressed problems involving the resettlement of workers of state owned industrial 
enterprises.34 The notice provided special treatment for the resettlement of workers; 
resettlement rights were given first priority when funds from the sale of assets, such as 
land use rights of the bankrupt SOE were distributed. 
 In 2006, the PRC’s Enterprise Bankruptcy law harmonised the various insolvency 
processes in China and enacted a unified law that replaced the old patchwork of 
Commission of the National People’s Congress (compilation), Laws of the People’s Republic of China 
(Civil and Commercial Laws 289-297) (1983-1986).
23 PRC Civil Procedure Law, promulgated by Order No 44 of the President of the PRC on 9 April 1991 
and effective as of that date.
24 See Booth, above n. 19, at 277.
25 Id.
26 Opinion on Questions Concerning the PRC Enterprise Insolvency Law, Ref No 2500/91.0.07. 
Printed in the Research Office of the Supreme People’s Court (compilation), The Assemblage of Judicial 
Interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court of the PRC (“1991 PRC Supreme People’s Court Opinion”).
27 W. Wang and C. Booth ‘Study on Alternative Approaches for Debt Restructuring of Enterprises in 
China’ (2002) World Bank Report for the State Economy and Trade Commission of China, World Bank, 
at 12.
28 X. Zhang and C. Booth ‘Beijing’s Initiative on Cross-Border Insolvency: Reflections on a Recent Visit 
of Hong Kong Professionals to Beijing’, 10 American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review, at 29-39 (2002). 
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 See Booth, above n. 19, at 280.
32 Id., at 279-280.
33 See Wang and Booth, above n. 27. At 8-16.
34 State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Proposal for Carrying Out State-Owned Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law in Some Cities, Document No. 59 (1994). 
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insolvency legislation.35 Major innovations in the new law included the replacement of 
the liquidation committee as the overseer of the bankruptcy process with administrators.36 
This change was meant to address a gap in control; the liquidation committee was formed 
15 days after the court has determined that a firm meets the requirements of the law and 
not when the firm declared bankruptcy. In addition to rules concerning administrators, 
the 2006 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law also addressed corporate reorganisation, a process 
that was technically permitted under the old law, but never used.37 Under the new law, 
both debtors and creditors may apply for reorganisation, meaning that a creditor may 
apply for the bankruptcy of a debtor, and vice versa.38 
3.1 Unit of Measurement
Laws can be categorised according to their legal status (i.e. the position a law has in a 
legal system’s hierarchy). In general, national laws are ranked higher than local laws. 
If a regulation embedded in a local law (defined as a law passed by a municipal or 
state legislature) contradicts a provision embedded in the national law, the national rule 
supersedes the local rule. In addition, laws are time sensitive; if two national rules have 
contradicting positions concerning the same issue, the national rule promulgated at the 
latest point in time, or the most current rule, prevails. 
 Due to this hierarchy of law, this article focuses on law at the national level. In China, 
the legislative body (the National People’s Congress) and the executive body (the State 
Council) have the power to promulgate laws at the national level. The judicial branch 
does not formally have the power to make law through the issuance of judicial precepts. 
Despite the authority of the State Council, this article only analyses the codified rules 
promulgated by the National People’s Congress, for reason of the latter body’s de jure 
rule maker status at the national level. 
 Since not all laws are structured in precisely the same way, only the most detailed level 
of analysis lends itself to proper longitudinal comparison. Our textual specific events are 
constructed as the combination of the occurrence of the event and the size of the event.39 
Determining the size of a national regulation may be accomplished through counting 
either the number of sentences, or the number of characters per rule. The individual 
unit of measurement is the specific text of an act, a collection of national regulations 
created during the law making process. An act is composed of various chapters, which 
may be subdivided into sections, articles, and paragraphs, referred to as sub clauses. The 
various provisions of the act are the individual regulations, which outline the specifics 
of a law; these regulations occur within paragraphs. Thus, the specific text refers to a 
count of the number of rules and the size of these rules, as measured by the number of 
sentences devoted to these rules. 
 When comparing a rule in Chinese to a rule in English, the number of sentences 
per rule is highly consistent in either language; this can be contrasted with the other 
two methods, which show marked variation. We believe that differences in characters 
between the two languages cause the sentence count method to be the most reliable. 
During the data collection process, we monitored the layout of the printed version of the 
laws in both Chinese and English, and compared this layout to the downloaded versions. 
Although differences in terms of typeface, size, margins and line spacing did occur, 
the average number of sentences per page was minimally affected by these changes. In 
addition, when comparing counts of the number of sentences per rule in Chinese and 
English, the two languages strongly correlate.40
35 S. Kargman ‘Solving the Insolvency Puzzle’, 34 China Business Review 5, at 44-48 (2007). 
36 Enterprise Insolvency Law of the People’s Republic of China (1 June 2007), Translated by the 
Bankruptcy Law and Restructuring Research Center of the Chinese University of Politics and Law of 
Beijing University, 17 International Insolvency Review 1, 33-55 (2008).
37 See Booth (2008), above n. 19, at 304-306.
38 2007 PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, Article 70.
39 A. van Witteloostuijn and G. De Jong ‘Ecology of National Rule Birth: A Longitudinal Study of Dutch 
Higher Education Law’, 20 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 1, at 198-199 (2010). 
40 Please contact the author for this analysis if interested.
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Dependent Variable. We use two dependent variables in this study. For Hypotheses 
1 and 2, we use the Rule Birth variable, which measures, on an annual basis, the 
generation of legal rules that did not previously exist in the text of the bankruptcy law. 
A revision of an existing rule is not counted as the birth of an entirely new rule. We 
distinguish between a revision and the generation of a new rule by following the law 
from its genesis. A revision is identified as an adjustment of a previous rule that does 
not supplant or render a previous rule obsolete. A rule birth event (the generation of a 
completely new rule) arises either through the extension of the legal domain of the EBL 
or through the replacement of an existing rule. When coding, two lawyers reviewed the 
various laws; inter-coder agreement was high, with initial coding yielding agreement in 
89% of the cases. For the remaining cases, agreement was reached via discussion.
 Our second dependent variable comprises of the number of total commercial 
bankruptcy filings from 1986 to 2009 obtained from the Chinese Statistical Yearbook. 
We use this variable in order to better distinguish legal rule proliferation from legal 
rule refinement. We include both firms that file for liquidation and reorganisation under 
the bankruptcy code. This measures the total use of both the bankruptcy law and the 
legal system. Whilst our measurement of organisational compliance does not address 
the degree to which firms actually follow the letter of the law, they do measure whether 
or not the firm places itself under the aegis of the bankruptcy law. 
Independent Variables. In order to account for whether the total number of rules present 
in the body of law has a positive influence on the likelihood of the further generation of 
rules, we use the total rule birth density variable to measure the total number of rules 
generated within the body of law of bankruptcy in a given year. In order to examine 
whether the law becomes more refined over time, we use the La Porta index of creditor 
rights.41 Examining change in the index of creditor rights allows us to measure whether 
or not the quality of the law increases or decreases as the law changes. This index 
consists of four binary variables. The first is facilitate reorganisation, which tests for 
restrictions placed on firms that file for reorganisation. These restrictions may come 
from the government via the influence of local government upon the reorganisation 
process, or from the court. A value of 1 indicates that no restrictions are present. Second, 
No Automatic Stay on Assets refers to whether assets are automatically frozen during 
bankruptcy, or may be put to productive use during the bankruptcy process. A value 
of 1 indicates that assets are not frozen during bankruptcy. Third, Secured Creditor 
Priority refers to whether or not a secured creditor, meaning a creditor who has received 
a security interest on the loan made to a bankrupt firm, is repaid first from the sale of 
assets; 1 indicates that the secured creditor has priority. Fourth, Management Stay refers 
to whether the management is able to remain with the firm or is replaced; 1 indicates 
that current management remains with the firm. 
 Lastly, as the issue of whether the bankruptcy law has a creditor or a debtor focus 
is also of importance, we code for whether a regulation provides rules for creditors or 
for debtors. This variable is measured on a binary basis, in which a value of 1 indicates 
that there is a rule requiring that the creditor must perform a task during bankruptcy 
proceedings.
Control Variables. Each individual rule is also categorised according to its form as 
either a procedure or a standard. A procedure consists of a set of instructions that may 
be applied by an actor in a relatively mechanical fashion. A standard gives direction to 
a legal organisation to measure an empirical occurrence against a predetermined set 
of values. A common example is negligence, in which the court must determine the 
degree to which there has been a dereliction of duty, as opposed to whether a dereliction 
of duty has occurred (which would be a procedure). The standard variable measures, 
on a binary basis, whether a rule is a standard; a value of 1 indicates the presence of a 
standard. 
41 R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, & R.W. Vishny ‘Law and Finance’, 106 Journal of 
Political Economy, at 1126-1151 (1998).
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 We also measure the length of the individual legal rules in order to control for the 
informational burden of a rule. As much of the negative impact of rule proliferation is 
linked to this burden, we control for the length of a rule in order to distinguish between 
the length and the amount of rules. In other words, there is a difference between a legal 
institution having a large number of very short rules versus the rules themselves being 
too long and hence containing too much information. The length of rules is a count 
variable, through which the number of sentences that make up a rule are counted. 
 In order to account for variation in the structural environment that may influence 
the use of law, we use a number of dummy variables to mark when China’s business 
environment experienced a macro-economic crisis, such as the Asian Financial Crisis 
(1998-2000). During a crisis, more companies are forced into bankruptcy, which may 
account for increases in the use of law. This variable is measured on a binary basis, 
with 1 indicating the presence of a crisis. Similarly, we also indicate the years in which 
the central government forced companies into bankruptcy. From 1994 to 1998, via 
its Capital Structure Optimization Program, the central government forced SOEs into 
bankruptcy. This Central Government Push variable is measured on a binary basis, with 
1 indicating that the government pushed state owned enterprises into bankruptcy during 
a specific year. Table 1 summarises and correlates all variables.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations
Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Standard 0.13 0.33 0 1 1
Rule Length 2.72 1.41 0 13 0.02 1
Central Government 
Push
0.18 0.38 0 1 -0.15* 0.02 1
Asian Financial 
Crises
0.11 0.31 0 1 -0.11* 0.01 0.13* 1
Total New Rule 
Generation (Annual 
Basis)
38.1 82.16 0 262 0.18* -0.01 -0.21* -0.16* 1
Facilitate 
Reorganisation
0.09 0.28 0 1 0.21* -0.02 -0.06* -0.01 0.07* 1
No Stay on Assets 0.02 0.14 0 1 0.01 0.02 -0.07* -0.05* 0.1* -0.05* 1
Secured Creditor 
Priority
0.04 0.19 0 1 0.02 0.05* 0.01 0 -0.01 0 0.03 1
Management Stay 0.06 0.03 0 1 0.08* 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0 -0.01 1
Creditor Focus 0.08 0.04 0 1 0.04* 0.05* 0.01 0 0.01 0.05* -0.03* -0.04* 0.07* 1
* The asterisk indicates a p of less than .05 or *p<.05.
4 Statistical Model
Since our data is an unbalanced panel and our dependent variable records when a legal 
rule is generated, we use a discrete time event-history analysis applied at the rule level to 
estimate the likelihood of the generation of a new rule.42 Event-history analysis models 
the amount of time that elapses until the event of interest occurs. Discrete time refers to 
the features of the time span in which the event of interest takes place. It is appropriate 
to use a discrete time event-history model when the time spans in the sample have been 
grouped into a discrete interval of time (in our case, a year).43 
 As the event of interest, a national rule birth, cannot occur at any point in the 
transition process, but rather is linked to discrete intervals in which the National People’s 
Congress is in session, we employ a discrete time event history model. Similarly, for 
42 N. Tuma and M.T. Hannan, Social Dynamics: Models and Methods (1984).
43 S.P. Jenkins, Survival Analysis (2004), Unpublished manuscript, Institute for Social and Economic 
Research, University of Essex.
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our alternative dependent variable, the number of firms that declare bankruptcy in a 
year, although the event may happen at any point throughout the year, the data on the 
event is banded together on an annual basis. Therefore, we also employ a discrete time 
framework for our second dependent variable.
 Within a discrete time framework, we utilise a proportional odds, or logistic model, 
which is formally defined as: 
h,j,X.= ,1-1+exp,−,α-j.−,β-′.X.
This model assumes that, where α is a constant that is allowed to vary between the 
tenure segments p, and β’xt is a row vector of coefficients (β) and covariates (x), the 
relative odds of a new rule being generated in year j, given the survival of a rule up to 
the end of the previous year, is given by the product of two components, a relative odds 
common to all rules in the data set and an individual specific scaling factor. The models 
were estimated using the logistic regression function of the STATA statistical software 
package.
4.1 Results
The results of our event history analysis of rule birth may be found in Table 2. Model 
1 in Table 2 regresses the likelihood of new rules being generated on a baseline model 
consisting of control variables. Model 2 adds the independent variables to this baseline 
model. Model 3 utilises the dependent variable of the number of organisations declaring 
bankruptcy and regresses the control and independent variables used for the national 
rule generation. 
 In our baseline model, the standard variable is significant and positive, indicating 
that, over time, new rules are more likely to be generated when an existing rule contains 
a standard. Research suggests that standards are more ambiguous than procedures, and 
give rise to further rules that fill in this ambiguity with mechanised procedures.44 In 
addition, the control variable for the push by the central government to force firms into 
bankruptcy is also positive and significant. This finding is also in line with previous 
research into the effect of the increased use of law upon the generation of law. In this 
context, the effect of forcing a higher number of firms into bankruptcy than would 
otherwise have declared this status had an expansive effect on the body of bankruptcy 
law.
 Hypothesis 1 predicted a rules breed rules dynamic, or that the generation of new 
rules in the previous rule would have a positive effect on the future generation of legal 
rules. Our results in Model 2 indicate support for Hypothesis 1, showing that the total 
number of new rules generated on an annual basis has a significant and positive effect 
on the likelihood that new rules would be generated in the following year. 
 Hypothesis 2 predicted that rules become more refined over time or, more specifically, 
that the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law would move to a debtor friendly regime. Our results 
in Model 2 indicate support for Hypothesis 2, as the presence of rules that facilitate the 
reorganisation of the firm and allow the firm control of assets during bankruptcy have 
a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of new rule generation. Thus, the new 
rules that are generated are more likely to move the bankruptcy regime towards a market 
friendly orientation. However, rules that allow the current management of the firm to 
remain with the firm have a negative and significant effect on the generation of future 
rules, suggesting that the refinement of the EBL is at least partially incomplete.
 Hypothesis 3 predicted that the number of firms declaring bankruptcy will decrease 
over time if the rules that are generated over time are not sufficiently debtor friendly. 
Using the dependant variable of the total number of firms declaring bankruptcy on 
an annual basis, we find support for Hypothesis 3 in Model 3. The total number of 
new rules generated per year has a significant negative effect on the number of firms 
declaring bankruptcy. Surprisingly, the standard and management stay variables have 
44 K. Pistor, M. Raiser, & S. Gelfer ‘Law and Finance in Transition Economies’, 8 Economics of Transition 
2, at 325-368 (2000).
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a positive effect on the number of rules declaring bankruptcy, which suggests that the 
presence of specific rules that do not proliferate over time may have a positive effect on 
the use of bankruptcy in China. 
Table 2: Logit Event History Model of the Likelihood 
of the Generation of New Rules
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Rule Birth Rule Birth # Organisations declaring bankruptcy
Control Variables
Standard 0.53* 0.36 0.82**
(0.19) (0.29) (0.42)
Rule Length -0.02 -0.03 0.01
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
C1: 1996-1998 0.69** 1.25* 0.21
(0.30) (0.37) (0.24)
C2: 1998 – 2000 0.14 0.7 0.15
(0.35) (0.42) (0.24)
Independent Variables
Total New Rule Generation 
(Annual Basis)
0.02* -0.01*
(0.01) (0.01)
Facilitate Reorganisation 0.01* -0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
No Stay on Assets 0.01* -0.02
(0.04) (0.03)
Secured Creditor Priority -0.02 0.18
(0.10) (0.10)
Management Stay -0.10* 0.08*
(0.02) (0.04)
Creditor Focus -0.18 0.31
(0.19) (0.17)
Constant -2.6* -4.32* 3.45*
(0.44) (0.64) (0.70)
Observations 3585 3585 3585
Standard errors in parentheses: ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%.
5 Discussion
In order to further explore the manner in which the evolution of a legal rule will affect 
its effectiveness, this article utilises quantitative assessment of the patterns of legal rule 
evolution. While legal change remains an important topic within modern jurisprudence, 
there is a marked absence of quantitative studies that chart the rise or fall of formal 
institutions.45 Most studies of legal change examine either the effect of a specific change 
on a regulated population, or conceptualise legal change as an outcome that denotes 
change in the power and preference distributions of law-making actors.46 This paper 
follows an alternative route in which the endogenous properties of change within formal 
institutions are examined. 
45 However, see Niblett et al., above n. 2, at 325.
46 See Levitsky and Murrillo, above n. 5, at 115-117.
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 Whilst discussion of the design of a formal institution may lead to greater 
comprehension of the effect of a specific change within a legal rule, and the study of power 
or preference distributions among agents aids the comprehension of their incentives to 
change laws, examining the relevance of the inherent properties of legal rules upon legal 
change illustrates the constraints under which design and power distributions operate. 
More specifically, even when design and power distributions favour a strong formal 
institution, endogenous properties of the legal rule may lead to a weak legal institution 
that fails to produce the proper behavioural response amongst the regulated population. 
Thus, the study of endogenous formal institutional properties is complementary to these 
perspectives and sheds further light upon the conditions that may give rise to successful 
legal rule creation. 
 Despite this contribution, there are several limitations. In this case, the empirical 
setting may resist generalisation. Although the examination of regulatory growth is 
facilitated by the examination of a body of law in a transition economy, as the transition 
from socialism to capitalism is abetted by the generation of new legal rules, these specific 
conditions do not necessarily generalise outside transition economies. Similarly, China 
may not be the most representative transition economy given its numerous characteristic 
divergences from this group. 
 Yet all economies must deal with the generation of new rules, and studies of rule 
generation in the United States and Canada form the basis of the division between 
regulatory accretion and refinement.47 In fact, insofar as developed countries enjoy more 
stable legal systems, issues of legal rule proliferation and corresponding institutional 
weakness may be more pertinent than in transition economies. Future research should 
analyse the history of a body of law in a developed economy and examine conditions 
underlying the relationship between rule refinement and institutional effectiveness. 
 In conclusion, one of the challenges accompanying the study of institutions is 
the necessity to disentangle the endogenous characteristics that help to determine 
the direction and intensity of institutional change from the exogenous factors that 
also explain the phenomena of institutional change. This challenge is compounded 
in the special case of formal institutions, given the importance of design and power 
distributions among agents for the successful generation and institutionalisation of legal 
rules. Yet the law must expand regardless; thus, even in the case of well-designed laws 
backed by powerful groups, the determination of the type of legal expansion may lead to 
a better understanding of organisational compliance, or non-compliance, with the law. 
47 See Ruhl and Salzman, above n. 1, at 763, 766-770; and see Jennings et al., above n. 3 at 621-640.

